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Consistency of shared reference frames should be reexamined
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In a recent Letter [G. Chiribella et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 120501 (2007)], four protocols
were proposed to secretly transmit a reference frame. Here We point out that in these protocols
an eavesdropper can change the transmitted reference frame without being detected, which means
the consistency of the shared reference frames should be reexamined. The way to check the above
consistency is discussed. It is shown that this problem is quite different from that in previous
protocols of quantum cryptography.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
As we know, reference frame (RF) [1] is a kind of un-
speakable information and consequently sharing of an RF
is generally more difficult than that of a string of key bits
as performed in a quantum key distribution (QKD) pro-
tocol [2]. In a recent Letter, Chiribella et al. proposed
four quantum-cryptographic protocols to secretly com-
municate an RF [3]. These protocols are subtly designed
so that the eavesdropper (say Eve) cannot obtain any in-
formation about the RF when it is transmitted between
the users (say Alice and Bob). Here, from a different per-
spective of security, we consider a special threat which
was not concerned in Ref. [3]. That is, after the commu-
nication, the consistency of the RF Alice sent with that
Bob received is still not assured. We will show that by a
special attack Eve can destroy this consistency without
introducing any detectable disturbance.
Let us take the first protocol in Ref. [3] as our exam-
ple, where Alice can transmit a secret direction (z axis)
to Bob with the help of a string of secret key bits shared
between them. Alice sends a sequence of spin- 1
2
particles
to Bob, whose particular states, i.e. spin up or down,
are determined by the shared key bits 0 or 1, respec-
tively. After receiving this sequence, Bob measures the
particles alternately along his own x, y, and z axes and
compares the measurement results with the shared key
bits. By calculating the error rates associate to the three
measurement directions, Bob can estimate the angles θx,
θy, θz between his three axes x, y, z and Alice’s z axis
[see Fig.1(a)]. Then Bob obtains the direction of Alice’s
z axis with a certain accuracy. To detect eavesdropping,
Bob checks whether the sum of the three angles’ squared
cosines differs from 1 by more than an allowable error.
Indeed, if Eve stays in the quantum channel and per-
forms blindly some measurements on the transmitted
particles to extract information of Alice’s z axis, her
eavesdropping would result in a depolarization of the
spins and it follows that she would be detected by Bob
(the three angles recovered by Bob would be inconsis-
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FIG. 1: (a) The way to estimate the direction of Alice’s z axis
zA. The three angles satisfy cos
2
θx + cos
2
θy + cos
2
θz = 1.
(b) Eve’s additional strategy to avoid a general prepare-and-
measure detection.
tent). However, Eve can take a special strategy to at-
tack. That is, she performs a unitary operation Ue on
each transmitted particle to rotate the spins by a certain
angle. Eve does not know the value of this angle because
she does not know what on earth the operator Ue is in
Alice’s representation (therefore the choice of Ue are at
random). But she need not know it. Here the purpose of
Eve is to destroy the communication instead of to extract
information of the transmitted direction (In fact, without
the key bits shared between Alice and Bob, Eve can never
elicit any information about the transmitted direction by
measurements on these qubits, which is very similar to
that in one-time pad). Since the role of this attack is
just rotate the spins by a same angle, Bob will obtain a
changed direction of Alice’s z axis and, more seriously,
he cannot detect the presence of Eve (obviously for any
direction, the three angles ηx, ηy , ηz between it and the
three axes x, y, z satisfy cos2ηx + cos
2ηy + cos
2ηz = 1).
Similar risk exists in other three protocols in Ref. [3],
where Alice would transmit a Cartesian frame to Bob
secretly. Consider any state |ψ〉 Alice will send to Bob.
Since |ψ〉 is generated by Alice according to her Cartesian
frame, from Bob’s point of view all spins are rotated by
a certain rotation g ∈ SU(2) which connects his axes
with that of Alice. Therefore, Bob’s aim is to infer g by
measurements on all the states Alice sent to him. This
2is the main idea of the three protocols. Here Eve can
also perform a unitary operation Ue on each particle (or
a collective rotation U⊗Ne ). Again, Eve just chooses a
unitary operation at random and does not know the value
of e referring to Alice’s Cartesian frame. Thus, after some
measurements, Bob’s inferred parameter, which connects
Alice and Bob’s axes, would be eg but not g. Apparently,
it looks like that the parameter Alice sent is indeed eg
instead of g, which is the only difference when this attack
happens. So, everything goes naturally. As a result, Bob
obtains a Cartesian frame different from Alice’s and Eve
would not be detected.
It can be seen that this special attack causes a severe
effect, that is, the RF cannot be successfully shared be-
tween Alice and Bob as they intended. More seriously, in
the end of the protocol, when Alice and Bob are congrat-
ulated for the successful sharing of the Cartesian frame,
they even do not know they have been cheated by Eve.
When Alice and Bob utilize the different RFs to dis-
tribute secret key bits [4], remarkable errors would ap-
pear. But at that time they still do not know whether the
RFs are inconsistent or an eavesdropper exists in the pro-
cess of key distribution, which is a really intractable busi-
ness. Consequently, this problem must be overcome in a
real implementation. In fact, the above attack is a special
kind of denial-of-service attack, and it is also forbidden
in a quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) pro-
tocol [5, 6].
To communicate something secretly, as generally re-
quired in quantum cryptography, we have to take all
thinkable attack strategies into consideration. Otherwise
the intended communications may be attacked success-
fully (for instances, see Refs. [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]). In
Ref. [3] the main attention is paid to forbid Eve to extract
information of the transmitted RF, while the consistency
of the two RFs is overlooked.
Now consider how to detect this special attack. Dif-
ferent from a general protocol of quantum cryptography,
Alice and Bob have not a shared RF before the com-
munication. Therefore, the ability of their possible ways
to check eavesdropping is limited. For example, as de-
scribed in Ref. [3], they can only check the uniqueness
of the transmitted direction or frame, or employ the ro-
tationally invariant subsystems of the test qubits to de-
tect. But both of them are useless for the special attack.
Another immediate manner to detect is to compare the
consistency of Alice and Bob’s RFs at the end of the
communication. In a QKD protocol Alice and Bob can
sample some of the key bits to check if the two keys are
identical publicly. However, this strategy cannot be used
here because the transmitted object is unspeakable infor-
mation which cannot be discussed directly in a classical
channel.
An alternative way to detect the special attack is using
the general prepare-and-measure model. In particular,
Alice (Bob) prepares a certain state and sends it to Bob
(Alice). After the measurement of Bob (Alice), they can
judge the consistency of their RFs by comparing the ini-
tial state and the measurement result in public. However,
this strategy would not work if Eve does an additional
trick. That is, Eve performs the unitary operation Ue on
all the qubits from Alice to Bob and another one U−1e on
all the qubits from Bob to Alice [see Fig.1(b)]. As dis-
cussed in above paragraphs, the difference of Alice and
Bob’s RFs is just Ue (under the above attack). As a re-
sult, under Eve’s operations Ue and U
−1
e , the prepared
state by Alice (Bob) and the measured state by Bob (Al-
ice) would exhibit the same physical features referring to
their respective RFs. Thus, no errors would appear when
Alice and Bob do their comparison.
In view of the above analysis, to expose the special at-
tack, the check qubits should not be transmitted in the
communication channel. A possible way is to use some
states which are previously shared between Alice and
Bob. For example, Alice and Bob share some entangled
pairs in the spin singlet state |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉−|10〉)/√2 be-
fore the communication of RF (that is, for each pair, Al-
ice holds one photon and Bob controls the other). When
a certain RF has been transmitted Alice and Bob mea-
sure the spins of each shared singlet state referring to
their respective RFs (the RF Alice sent and the one Bob
received). Afterwards they compare the measurement re-
sults publicly. If two RFs are identical the results should
be determinately anti-correlated. By this way, Alice and
Bob can assure the consistency of the two RFs (with cer-
tain accuracy) when the error rate of this comparison is
low enough. However, there is a problem in this detec-
tion. That is, the requirement of shared singlet pairs is
too strong, with which Alice and Bob can even achieve
the whole transmission of a private RF [13]. Obviously,
if Alice measures the spins of her photons in the shared
singlet pairs referring to her RF and announces the re-
sults, Bob can obtain the RF by the technique similar to
that in the first protocol in Ref. [3].
One may argue that Eve can do the same sort of at-
tack in many other situations (for example, one-time pad,
QKD, and QSDC) and consequently it is not so mean-
ingful to discuss this problem further here. However, it
is not the fact for the case of RF sharing. As far as
this attack is concerned, the transmission of an RF and
that of a classical or quantum message are quite differ-
ent. More specifically, when a message is transmitted,
this kind of attack can be easily avoided by the man-
ners of message authentication, error correction code, or
directly sampling some random transmitted bits/qubits
to check eavesdropping [6]. But all these manners are
useless for the transmission of an RF. From the above
analysis we can see that this problem is intractable and
far from being totally resolved. It is urgent to find an ef-
fective way to detect this attack (or check the consistency
of the shared RFs) in the transmission of an RF. As a
result, though this problem can be accepted as inevitable
in previous cryptographic models such as one-time pad,
QKD, and QSDC, it should be paid more attention in
the case of RF sharing.
In conclusion, we present a special attack to the proto-
3cols of secret communication of RF, by which an eaves-
dropper can change the transmitted RF without being
detected. It means that the obtained RF should be re-
examined in such protocols. Furthermore, the way to
check the consistency of the two RFs is discussed though
it needs more further study. Note that the communi-
cation of RF is a new topic and it may interest many
scholars. We hope that the special attack is noticed and
taken into account in the following research.
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